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RULEMAKING: THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD'S PRESCRIPTION
FOR THE RECURRING PAINS OF
THE HEALTH CARE
INDUSTRY
Americans spend more of their income on health care than do the citizens
of any other nation in the world, in both absolute and relative terms.1 The
annual health care bill in the United States is estimated at $650 billion.2
Health care costs are increasing annually at two to three times the rate of
inflation3 and are predicted to reach $1.5 trillion before the year 2000.' In
fact, health care costs claim an exorbitant share of our national wealth-
12% of the gross national product-a share that is on a growth curve of
amazing proportions.5 Every sector of the American population is affected
by the burden of these ever-increasing costs.
Some commentators emphasize that health care spending is a major bur-
den on the public fisc and a contributing factor to economic recession.6 In
the private sector, analysts argue that the increased cost of providing health
care services is passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices.7
Other commentators theorize that the "healthy" consumer is indirectly pay-
ing the increased costs of health care through higher health care insurance
premiums.' Still others believe that these costs are recouped by employers in
1. Mark Bernstein, The Coming Rationing of Health Care, OHIO, Feb. 1991, at 18, 19.
2. Michael A. Verespej, Health Care: Not Too Complex to Solve, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 6,
1992, at 38, 38.
3. Id.
4. How Much Will Be Too Much?, INDUSTRY WK., Sept. 17, 1990, at 27, 27.
5. Verespej, supra note 2, at 38. In 1950, health care costs consumed 4.5% of the gross
national product. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 19. The figure was 7.3% in 1970. Id. At this
rate, health care costs will represent 19.1% of the gross national product in twenty years,
approximately what is now spent in education, agriculture, and defense combined. Id.
6. See, e.g., Julie Kosterlitz, The Growth Industry, 48 NAT'L J. 2917, 2917-19 (1991).
The public sector cannot pass costs on to workers or consumers and is therefore caught be-
tween rising demands to provide health services and taxpayer resistance to new revenue-raising
measures. Id. at 2919.
7. Id. at 2918. In the mid-1980s, former Health, Education and Welfare Secretary, Jo-
seph A. Califano, Jr., speaking as advisor to Chrysler Corporation, argued that the cost of
employer-provided health care benefits was adding $500 to $700 to the cost of each Chrysler
car. Id.
8. Id.
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the form of lower wages paid to all employees.9 All interested parties would
agree, however, that the plight of the thirty-seven million Americans who
are without health insurance' ° is in large part a tragic result of the increased
cost of health care and health insurance, and that this tragedy only worsens
the malady of the system.
Health care is big business. In 1989, U.S. merger and acquisition activity
in the health service industry culminated in 141 mergers with a market value
of $28.5 billion." In the midst of a prolonged economic downturn and with
unemployment on the rise, the health care sector stands out as a prime ex-
ample of a recession-proof industry.' 2 According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, from 1989 to 1990, employment in the private health care sector
grew more than three times as fast as in the private sector as a whole.' 3 The
industry, however, is struggling nonetheless. Early in 1991, Fortune maga-
zine characterized the health care industry as "infirm" with a grim prognosis
for recovery,' 4 in large part due to the burden of expenses that continue to
outpace inflation.' 5 Although industry revenues increased by 10.9% in
1990, industry expenses increased by a greater margin of 11.1% in the same
year.' 6
Increased competition from HMOs 7 and nonhospital providers such as
urgent care centers, outpatient surgery centers, outpatient birthing centers,
diagnostic centers, and companies that deliver intravenous feedings and
9. Id. Any employer with a population of unionized employees has difficulty accepting
this argument. Wages and benefits packages that are agreed upon in collective bargaining
negotiations are typically memorialized in a three-year contract.
10. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 19.
11. 1989 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1990, at 57, 61.
12. Kosterlitz, supra note 6, at 2917. The health care sector handles economic difficulties
better than most other business sectors because people continue to get sick and injured regard-
less of business cycles. Id. at 2919.
13. Id.
14. Rahul Jacob & Shelly Neumeier, The Winners and Losers, FORTUNE, Jan. 14, 1991, at
76, 80.
15. Id.
16. Lawrence Wu, Hospitals End 1990 with Negative Patient Margin in Aggregate, HosPi-
TALS, May 5, 1991, at 34, 34. All health care providers are not losing money, however. Jacob
& Neumeier, supra note 14, at 80. A Salomon Brothers analyst expected earnings at Humana,
the largest publicly held hospital company, to increase by a healthy 16% in 1991. Id. "The
company operates a lucrative group insurance business that refers cases to its hospitals." Id.
17. A 1985 study showed that hospital admissions from health maintenance organization
members are 40% lower than those for a typical fee-for-service group. Dean C. Coddington et
al., Strategiesfor Survival in the Hospital Industry, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June, 1985, at 129,
132. This is attributed to the HMO's philosophy of preventative medicine, its careful screen-
ing of the subscriber and his or her physician prior to admission into the hospital, and its close
monitoring of patients while hospitalized. Id.
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medications at home,18 is adding salt to the already deep wounds of the sky-
rocketing expenses of hospitals.' 9 These alternative providers are aggres-
sively competing for patients,20 and their ability to provide care at a lower
cost than hospitals makes them very appealing to employers and insurers.2
In fact, a 30% growth rate was predicted for these non-hospital providers in
1991.22 In addition, hospitals continue to lose money on programs such as
Medicare, which in 1990 reimbursed hospitals less than ninety-five cents on
the dollar.2 3 Because hospitals derive one-half of their revenues from such
programs, the impact of these losses is considerable.24
"We have a system that nobody's happy with: not the government, not
business, not the hospitals."25 Although many strategies are available as po-
tential solutions to the interrelated problems of the increasing costs of pro-
viding and of receiving health care, the most popular strategy attacks the
expense side of the equation, seeking to provide services at the lowest possi-
ble cost.
26
Health care is labor intensive. Labor costs, in fact, constitute 60% of total
hospital costs and, therefore, represent an area of great financial concern for
hospital administrators and an expense that requires precise and constant
monitoring.27 The labor intensity of the industry is increasing and the costs
of labor, along with other expenses, have risen. 28 In 1950, the typical hospi-
tal hired approximately two employees per inpatient bed.29 Only a small
number of these employees were college graduates.30 Most were women
who were underpaid, largely due to long-perpetuated stereotypes.3 '
18. Id. at 131-32; see also Jacob & Neumeier, supra note 14, at 80.
19. Hospitals, as the average American knows them, represent approximately 40% of the
health care industry as a whole. Jacob & Neumeier, supra note 14, at 80.
20. Coddington et al., supra note 17, at 131-32.




25. Id. (quoting Alexander Williams, III, senior vice president of the American Hospital
Association).
26. Coddington et al., supra note 17, at 133. "[I]t is clear that if hospitals are to survive,
they must operate more efficiently." Id. at 134. "Just as business cannot compete if its prod-
ucts are [of] poor or [in] quality and its manufacturing facilities inferior, America can no
longer afford inefficient hospitals .... " Verespej, supra note 2, at 38.
27. Royce Diener, Controlling Hospital Costs. Government Rationing or the Voluntary Ef-
fort, NAT'L J., June 2, 1979, at 929, 933. In perspective, the health care sector provides ap-
proximately 8.3 million Americans with jobs, nearly 9% of all of the nation's private sector
employment. Kosterlitz, supra note 6, at 2919.
28. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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Today, a typical urban hospital may have as many as four employees per
bed. 32 Most positions require that the employee have at least an undergrad-
uate degree and, therefore, pay at or near competitive wages.33 As the mar-
ket for skilled labor qualified to meet the demands of increased health care
technology tightens, hospitals are forced to increase their wages dramatically
in order to remain competitive in the job market.34 In fact, health care
wages overall have risen faster than all other wages over most of the past
fifteen years.3a Without question, "[1]abor is... the most important element
of health care inflation.",
36
I. MANAGEMENT'S PERSPECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Despite the fact that labor costs are closely monitored by hospital admin-
istrators, many of the factors that contribute to the expense of labor may not
be completely within management's control. The great jurist, Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, wrote while serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts in 1896:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that
between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his serv-
ices, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get
his services for the least possible return. Combination on the one
side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other side is the
necessary and desirable counterpart if the battle is to be carried on
in a fair and equal way.37
Although ahead of its time, this proclamation accurately expresses the phi-
losophy that has long guided the labor relations policy of the United States:
the affirmative support by the federal government of unionism and collective
bargaining among workers who choose to be represented by a union.3" It
also aptly describes the typical relationship between management and organ-
ized labor as a battle, albeit one of economic warfare. Union avoidance is a
familiar strategy employed by the management teams who are faced with the
threat of unionization. The health care industry is no exception.
Initially, the union-management conflict is sparked by frustration. Em-




35. Kosterlitz, supra note 6, at 2920.
36. Alden Solovy, Health Care in the 1990s: Forecasts by Top Analysts, HOSPITALS, July
1989, at 34, 36 (quoting Darwin Beck, a vice president of First Boston Corporation, New York
City). ,
37. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988) (especially 29 U.S.C. § 151).
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terested party between them and their employees.39 The major source of
employer opposition to unionization, however, is undoubtedly its cost to the
employer. Union organization campaigns, the process by which unions typi-
cally gain initial employee support prior to a representation election, cost
employers much time, effort, and money. Employers must wage an equally
.effective campaign in order to attempt to secure a nonunion status through
the votes of what the employer hopes to be contented and well-informed
employees. Unionization inevitably increases administrative costs and most
likely means increased labor costs due to higher wages and more expensive
benefits.'
These costs are further inflated when a newly elected union begins to par-
ticipate in the collective bargaining process. New unions typically file a
greater number of grievances and seek to bargain over a greater number of
issues in order to justify their presence and to assure the employees that they
made the right decision in electing the union as their representative.41 Effec-
tively counteracting this union-initiated activity is not only "cumbersome,
time consuming and very frustrating for administrators,"42 but also very
expensive.
In addition, when an employee population is represented by more than
one union, management fears "the whipsaw effect," whereby two or more
unions play against each other to gain a bargaining advantage over the em-
ployer.43 For example, assume that an employer's workforce is represented
by two different unions, union A and union B. Assume further that union A
has recently negotiated pay increases and improved benefits over the next
.three years. Sometime in the near future, when union B comes to the bar-
gaining table, its representatives may demand concessions greater than those
in union A's collective bargaining agreement. When several unions employ
this strategy, "management gets caught in a never-ending battle for
advantage."'
Another source of tension is the fact that unionization typically reduces
39. Todd Stein, Healthcare Unions Flex Newfound Legal Muscle, Bus. J. (Sacramento),
June 3, 1991, at 19, 28. At its most pessimistic, management's view is represented by the
-following statement: "'Communication is already tough enough; now management has to go
through a middle person every time they want to talk with an employee. That makes em-
ployee relations very difficult.' " Id. (quoting Floyd Palmer, a labor attorney for hospitals and
a partner in Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy).
40. Id. "When people pay dues to a union, they're looking for a return on their invest-





44. This hypothetical is based on one presented by Stein, supra note 39, at 19, 28.
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management's decision-making flexibility because job duties, wages, schedul-
ing, and other conditions of employment are predetermined and set forth in
the collective bargaining agreement. This creates a special challenge for hos-
pital executives. To illustrate, one analyst advises that hospitals, by more
effective deployment of their human resources, could reduce their labor costs
by 30%. 5 An increasing number of hospital executives already condemn
the health care industry's affinity for a "caste-like" system of employment
and the resulting "turf-conscious work force" that is composed of too many
types of technicians, all of whom are in short supply.46 In response, some
hospital administrators treat both ailments, increased costs and labor
shortages, with one remedy: cross-training, a relatively simple notion that
employees who have been trained to perform multiple tasks may be deployed
more efficiently.47 Such innovation is made more difficult when wages, job
duties and scheduling requirements have been negotiated in advance and are
set forth in a binding agreement. Finally, management fears the potential
for labor unrest, which can affect both the cost and the quality of services
rendered, especially when it results in work stoppages or strikes.
In consideration of the pressures created by the inherent tensions between
organized labor and management, the financial difficulties facing hospitals,
and the need for effective national labor relations policies in the health care
industry, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) recently issued a
substantive rule mandating the appropriateness of petitioned-for collective
bargaining units4" in the health care industry.49 Following a discussion of
the history of the National Labor Relations Act and its impact on the health
care industry, this comment reviews the Board's rulemaking endeavors and
45. Linda Perry, Staff Cross-Training Caught in Cross-Fire, MOD. HEALTHCARE, May 6,
1991, at 26, 27 (quoting Steven Cohn, President of Medical Management Planning, in
Calabasas, Cal.).
46. Id. at 26.
47. Id. Health care executives have borrowed this concept from employers in the high-
tech manufacturing industry. "Motorola, for example, trains its employees for as many as a
dozen tasks, moving them from station to station in its manufacturing plants as the production
process warrants it." Id. According to a 1988 study conducted by the National Multiskilled
Practitioner Clearinghouse at the University of Alabama in Birmingham, 25% of 546 hospitals
had trained employees to perform more than one job. Id. at 27. The cross-training trend,
however, is a recent one. Id. The survey showed that 70% of the cross-trained workers had
learned their second skill within the past five years. Id. The most popular plan is to teach a
second clinical skill to experienced clinical workers. Id. Other models teach a clinical skill to
a clerical worker and teach a second, lower-level skill to clinical workers. Id. at 27-28.
48. A bargaining unit is a group of employees that has been targeted by a union or that
has sought out union representation. It may be composed of virtually any combination of
employees. Unions and employers are in near constant disagreement as to appropriate makeup
of these units. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1992).
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considers the merits of the health care industry's vehement opposition to the
rule that the American Hospital Association 5° took to the Supreme Court.51
This comment examines the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Board's
rulemaking authority and its approval of the Board's rule as promulgated.
This comment then considers some recent cases that the Board has ad-
dressed since the Supreme Court's decision, focusing on the likely effect that
the rule will have on future disputes over the appropriateness of petitioned-
for bargaining units. This comment concludes with an assessment of the
likely success of the rule at obtaining the Board's asserted goals and the
rule's probable impact on future union representation cases.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING UNITS
The National Labor Relations Act (the "Act") was enacted on July 5,
1935.52 This statute declared the United States' policy of encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining "by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing ... The Act also established
the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") as the administrative
body that enforces the policy and provisions of the Act.54 The Board con-
sists of five members appointed by the President for staggered five-year
terms.55 The Board has the power to determine the appropriateness of the
unit of employees for which representation is sought.56
50. The American Hospital Association (the AHA), headquartered in Chicago, Ill., is an
association of individuals and health care institutions including hospitals, health care systems,
and pre- and postacute health care delivery organizations that was founded in 1898 and pres-
ently has some 54,500 members. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASS'NS, Vol. 1, Part 2, Entry 12,769
(Deborah M. Burek ed., 26th ed. 1991). The AHA represents hospitals in national legislation;
carries out research and educational projects; offers programs for institutional effectiveness
review, technology assessment, and administrative services to hospitals; and conducts educa-
tional programs for and furnishes educational materials to its members. Id.
51. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, Ill S. Ct. 1539, aff'g 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir, 1990).
52. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
53. Id. § 151.
54. Id. §§ 153-55.
55. Id. § 153.
56. 46 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 31 (1981). Thereafter, the Board has the power to formally
certify a collective bargaining representative upon the basis of the results of a Board-conducted
election. Id. The Senate Report accompanying the Act explained rather cryptically that the
Board was empowered under section 9(b) of the Act to determine appropriate units because
"there can be no choice of representatives and no bargaining unless units for such purposes are
first determined. And employees themselves cannot choose these units, because the units must
be determined before it can be known what employees are eligible to participate in a choice of
any kind." S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1935), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
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Section 9(b) of the Act broadly defines an appropriate collective bargain-,
ing unit as one that assures to employees "the fullestdfreedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by . . . [the Act]." 5  Appropriate bargaining units
typically consist of groups of employees with the same or related job func-
tionsi5 a Once a unit has been determined to be appropriate, a representation
election may be held among the employees who comprise that unit.5 9 Under
section 9(a) of the Act, the collective bargaining representative that has been
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
unit is the exclusive representative of all the employees in that unit "for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment."'
Guided by the Act's general statement of purposes and standards, the
Board has formulated certain criteria over the past forty years that are appli-
cable to the determination of the appropriate unit.6 In so doing, the Board
applies either a "community of interests" or a "disparity of interests" stan-
dard to the facts of the particular case. 62 Under the traditional community-
of-interests test, the Board examines the unit to determine if the employees
share a community of interest with respect to their wages, hours, and condi-
tions of employment.63 If a separate and distinct community of interests
exists that is unique to the petitioned-for unit of employees, that unit is
found appropriate, and an election is then directed in that unit." The Board
held in 1984, however, that it could better effectuate its statutory obligations
in health care unit determinations by adopting the disparity-of-interests
test.65 This standard judges the appropriateness of a unit using the tradi-
tional criteria; however, "sharper than usual differences (or 'disparities') be-
tween the wages, hours and working conditions, etc., of the requested
employees and those in an overall professional or nonprofessional unit must
HISTORY OF THE NLRA, 1935, at 2313 (1985). The Board has the responsibility of
"decid[ing] in each case" what is an appropriate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
58. John R. Shelton, NLRB Guidelines for Determining Health Care Industry Bargaining
Units: Judicial Acceptance or Back to the Drawing Board, 78 Ky. L.J. 143, 143-44 (1990).
59. 46 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 31 (1981). The Board may conduct such an election after a
petition has been filed by or on behalf of the employees or by an employer who has been
confronted with a claim for recognition from an individual or labor organization. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
61. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
62. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,905 (1988).
63. K. Bruce Stickler & Mark D. Nelson, NLRB Proposes Rulemaking for Determining
Health Care Bargaining Units, 20 Hosp. L. 128, 128 (1987).
64. Id.; see, e.g., Dahl Oil Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1312 (1975) (approving a unit having
found a community of interests among the unit employees evidenced by common terms and
conditions of employment, supervision and overlapping duties).
65. Saint Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 950 (1984).
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be established to grant the unit."'6 6 In fact, the Board has recognized that
these two tests are not significantly different, holding that the disparity-of-
interests standard, to a great extent, embodies the community-of-interests
approach.67
In all cases, the Board considers the totality of circumstances surrounding
the employment of the members of the proposed unit;68 yet, in certain situa-
tions, its determination is limited by provisions of the amended Act. 69 Con-
gress, however, by prescribing that each case be decided on its own facts,
afforded the Board broad discretion to determine appropriate employee units
for the purposes of collective bargaining.7°
Labor and management are continually at odds over the appropriate com-
position of the bargaining unit that is to participate in a representation elec-
tion. Organized labor would generally prefer to organize and represent- a
greater number of small units; however, from the employer's perspective, a
lesser number of large units of employees is the more manageable of the two
evils.71 Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the parties routinely take a posi-
66. Id. at 953. See, e.g., Park Manor Care Ctr., Inc., 305 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1991) (stating
that the disparity-of-interests test requires sharper than usual differences in wages, hours, and
working conditions between unit and nonunit employees before the requested unit will be
approved).
67. Saint Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., 285 N.L.R.B. 365, 368 (1987).
68. Id. For example, the Board has considered employees' wages, hours, and working
conditions; qualifications, training, and skills; frequency of contacts and extent of interchange
with other employees; frequency of transfers into and out of the unit sought; common supervi-
sion; degree of functional integration; collective bargaining history; and area bargaining pat-
terns and practices. Id.
69. "Professional employees," "guards," and "supervisors" are defined in the statute. 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(12), 159(b), 152(11), respectively. Supervisors and independent contractors are
expressly excluded from the definition of employees covered by the Act and may not be in-
cluded in any bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). No unit that includes both professional
and nonprofessional employees will be found appropriate unless a majority of professional
employees vote for inclusion in such a unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). In addition, guards who
enforce rules to protect the property of an employer or to protect the safety of persons on that
employer's premises must be included in a separate and distinct unit. Id.
70. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 699
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
71. The Seventh Circuit recognized the basic conflict between management and unions as
to the composition of bargaining units in American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 654
(7th Cir. 1990), rev'g 718 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991):
From organized labor's standpoint, generally the more units there are the better.
This is because the smaller and more homogeneous a bargaining unit is, the easier it
will be for the members to agree on a mutually advantageous course of collective
action, and therefore the more attractive a union will be, unionization being the vehi-
cle for collective action by employees .... The diversity of ... interests of the mem-
bers of a large and heterogeneous unit . . . make[s] collective action difficult, [and
makes it] hard for a union to gain majority support in such a unit .... [T]he em-
ployer's perspective is different. The more units there are, the more costly it will be
1993]
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tion on the scope of a unit based not on an esoteric interpretation of Board
precedent, but rather on their best prediction of which particular configura-
tion will more likely produce winning election results for their side. 72 In
making unit determinations, the Board is required to strike a balance among
the competing interests of unions, employees, employers, and the public at
large. 3 The precise balance among these competing interests is not explic-
itly defined in the Act; the Board determines the appropriate balance based
on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.74
III. RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION
Throughout its history, and despite its statutory rulemaking power,7 5 the
Board has chosen to formulate national labor policy almost exclusively
through the process of adjudication, the case-by-case determination of the
appropriate solution for each different set of facts.7 6 This aversion to
rulemaking survived a 1947 congressional reaffirmation of the Board's
rulemaking authority in the Taft-Hartley Amendments. 77 In the two de-
cades that followed, as the use of rulemaking in other federal agencies grew,
and as a growing body of commentary and judicial opinions developed that
encouraged rulemaking and sought to improve its processes, the Board con-
tinued to embrace adjudication as its preferred method of operation. 78
for the employer to negotiate collective bargaining contracts. And work stoppages
will be likelier, because there will be more separate decision-making centers each of
which can call a strike, and because majority support for a strike call is more likely
the more homogeneous a unit is and hence the likelier all members to benefit if the
union wins.
Id.
72. Berton B. Subrin, Conserving Energy at the Labor Board: The Casefor Making Rules
on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. L.J. 105, 105 (1981).
73. American Hosp. Ass'n, 899 F.2d at 654. The Seventh Circuit recognized that the inter-
ests of the employees are not always identical to those of unions. Id.
74. Id. at 654 (citing Continental Web Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir.
1984); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1469 (7th Cir. 1983); 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988).
75. 29 U.S.C. § 156. "The Board shall have the authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 [(the
Administrative Procedure Act)], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of [the Act]." Id.
76. MARK H. GRUNEWALD, THE LABOR BOARD'S FIRST RULEMAKING: AN EXERCISE
IN PRAGMATISM 1 (1991) (a report prepared for the consideration of and published by the
Administrative Conference of the United States). There are some exceptions to the exclusivity
of adjudication. The Board used rulemaking to establish jurisdictional standards for private
colleges and universities and for symphony orchestras. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1-103.2 (1992). The
Board also used rulemaking in deciding not to assert jurisdiction over the horseracing indus-
try. 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1992).
77. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988).
78. GRUNEWALD, supra note 76, at 3.
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Finally, in 1969, the Supreme Court declared that the Board had, in effect,
promulgated a rule, although in doing so, the Board had violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.' 9 Relying on this case, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals later argued that the Board was required to proceed by
rulemaking, rather than by adjudication, when it proposes to "reverse a
long-standing and oft-repeated policy" in representation cases.8 0  The
Supreme Court, however, subsequently disagreed, holding that the Board
has the discretion to proceed either by adjudication or by rulemaking in ef-
fecting a change in policy, as long as the Board's holding does not amount to
an abuse of its discretion."'
In 1978, Congress considered legislation that would have required the
Board to employ rulemaking in several areas.8 2 Although this legislative
attempt was unsuccessful, the Senate committee that had endorsed the legis-
lation made a noteworthy observation that "there [was] no labor relations
issue on which there [was] such a strong consensus of scholarly opinion as
on the proposition that the Board should make greater use of its [statutorily
authorized] rulemaking authority. '"83
The Board's authority to fashion rules through common law, case-by-case
adjudication is clear.84 The Board, throughout its history of case-by-case
adjudication, however, has moved closer and closer to the establishment of
79. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). In this case, the Board, pursuant
to its previous decision in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), ordered a
representation election among the employees and directed the employer to furnish a list of
names and addresses of those employees who were determined to be members of the appropri-
ate bargaining unit for distribution to the parties interested in the election. Wyman-Gordon,
394 U.S. at 761. The Supreme Court rejected the Board's suggestion that, without complying
with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA), "commands, decisions,
or policies announced in adjudication are 'rules' in the sense that they must, without more[,] be
obeyed by the affected public." Id. at 764-66. The APA requires, among other things, publi-
cation in the Federal Register of notice of proposed rulemaking and of hearing; opportunity to
be heard; a statement in the rule of its basis and purposes; and publication in the Federal
Register of the rule as adopted. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). The Court, however, also recognized
that adjudicated cases may "serve as vehicles for the formulation of agency policies, which are
applied and announced therein." Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 765. "They generally provide a
guide to action that the agency may be expected to take in future cases." Id. at 765-66. Justice
Black, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred, explaining that the Board's use of
the term "rule" in applying the so-called "Excelsior rule" implied a rule of law such as would
be announced in a court opinion and not necessarily the kind of a rule required to be promul-
gated in accordance with the rulemaking procedures of the APA. Id. at 769 n. 1. For the sake
of clarity, Justice Black thereafter made reference to the Excelsior "requirement". Id.
80. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 497 (2d Cir. 1973),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
81. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
82. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
83. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
84. Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. at 290-95.
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"relative fixed rules" or "principles" that have come to guide the parties in
union representation cases. s5 Because these principles are developed
through Board precedent and are not promulgated in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, the principles are themselves subject to po-
tential judicial review each time the Board applies them to cases before it. 6
For thlis reason, case-by-case adjudication has been a source of frustration
not 6nly for the Board, 7 but also for at least one circuit court."8 In 1987,
Professor Charles Morris, Editor-in-Chief of The.Developing Labor Law, a
well-respected and frequently cited treatise on labor law, opined that sub-
stantive rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and the
National Labor Relations Act was "probably the most important thing the
Board [could] do to effectuate its process, economize its time, and advise the
people who need to know-most of whom are not lawyers-what the law
requires." 9
IV. LABOR RELATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
The Act as originally enacted in 1935 did not contain an exemption for
health care institutions.9" The Board was granted discretion in its exercise
of jurisdiction, and it initially asserted that jurisdiction over all health care
85. Subrin, supra note 72, at 110; see, e.g., the "contract bar rules" discussed in Appalach-
ian Shale Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1163-64 (1958); the "Excelsior rule" enunciated in
Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-42 (1966); and the "Peerless Plywood
rule" explicated in Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429-30 (1953).
86. Subrin, supra note 72, at 110 (citing NLRB v. Saint Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1979); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1978); NLRB v.
Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 575 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1978)). In cases in which the Board
indicates that application of a previously established principle will require a weighing of cer-
tain case-specific factors, "reviewing courts are tempted to look over the Board's shoulder and
do their own weighing, especially if it appears that the Board is finding 'X' unit appropriate 99
per cent of the time." Subrin, supra note 72, at 110. In fact, by 1987, the Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had all held that the legislative history of the
Act warranted a different approach to fashioning health care bargaining units from the tradi-
tional community-of-interest criteria. Stickler & Nelson, supra note 63, at 128-29.
87. Out of a sample of 25 post-1976 circuit court decisions that reviewed Board unit de-
terminations in the health care industry, approximately two-thirds of those decisions have been
unfavorable to the Board and either refused to enforce Board orders or remanded to the Board
for further consideration. Kathleen A. Curran, Note, The National Labor Relations Board's
Proposed Rules on Health Care Bargaining Units, 76 VA. L. REV. 115, 130-31 (1990).
88. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) (expressing frustra-
tion with repeated case-by-case analyses on a charge nurse-supervisory issue and stating that
although "the Board is entitled to some judicial deference in interpreting its organic statute as
well as in finding facts, it would be entitled to even more if it had awakened its dormant
rulemaking powers for the purpose of particularizing the application.., to the medical field").
89. Charles J. Morris, The NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old Board Learn New
Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 27 (1987).
90. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified as amended in
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employers. 9  When Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,92 it ex-
empted not-for-profit hospitals by excluding from the definition of "em-
ployer" any corporation or association operating a hospital if no part of the
net earnings inured to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
93
In 1960, the Board exercised its jurisdictional discretion and decided that all
.hospitals should be removed from coverage.94 This position was reversed
seven years later when the Board held that only not-for-profit hospitals and
their employees should be exempt from the coverage of the Act.95 Early in
the first session of the 93rd Congress in 1973, Congress, in response to pre-
dictions that organized labor was intending to make a strong effort to secure
the repeal of the statutory exemption for not-for-profit hospitals, 96 consid-
ered a bill that would have extended the Act's coverage to all private health
care institutions, including not-for-profit hospitals.97 "The proposed legisla-
tion was highly controversial, largely because of the concern that labor un-
rest in the health care industry might be especially harmful to the public." 98
This bill did not pass.99
By the second session of the 93rd Congress, the staffs of the House and
Senate Labor Committees, representatives of the health care industry, and
organized labor officials had already been involved in considerable discus-
sion of these issues. Consideration of health care amendments to the Act
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (amending the National Labor Relations Act to extend its
coverage and protection to employees of "health care institutions").
91. Robert Taft, Jr., American Hospital Association v. NLRB: Can the NLRB Promul-
gate Rules Establishing per se Appropriate Bargaining Units for Acute Care Hospitals?, 24 J.
HEALTH & HosP. L. 2 (1991).
92. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988)).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (repealed 1974).
94. Flatbush Gen. Hosp., 126 N.L.R.B. 144, 145 (1960), overruled by Butte Medical
Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967).
95. Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967).
96. Taft, supra note 91, at 2.
97. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973). Thisbill also sought to place a limit of five on
the number of bargaining units in not-for-profit health care institutions. Id. § 9.
98. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, Ill S. Ct. 1539, 1544 (1991). These public policy
concerns were recently addressed by the Seventh Circuit:
[T]he work force of a hospital.., tends to be at once small and heterogeneous.... If
the desirability (from the union standpoint) of homogeneous units is stressed, even a
hospital of average size might have ten or twenty or even more units, each with a
bare handful of workers. The cost of the institution's labor relations and the
probability of work stoppages would soar. Wages might soar, too .... Work stop-
pages, heavy bargaining costs, soaring wages, labor unrest-all these are matters of
concern in a period of high and rising costs of health care.
American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, Ill S. Ct. 1539
(1991).
99. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see Taft, supra note 91, at 2.
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recommenced. oo The proponent of the legislation agreed that in this session
it would be advisable to stay as close as possible to the number of units
proposed in the first session, to minimize political opposition from unions
and the health care industry, and to grant the Board the flexibility it needed
to avoid bargaining unit proliferation on a case-by-case basis.' 1 Senator
Taft stressed the need for the Board to consider the public interest, especially
the increasing cost of health care, in determining appropriate units.' 2 After
much debate,'03 the National Labor Relations Amendments of 1974 were
enacted. "' The health care amendments represented a congressional com-
promise between the truly incompatible interests of two of its important con-
stituencies: the health care industry and organized labor.'0 5  The
amendments subjected all acute care hospitals, °6 both profit and not-for-
profit, to the coverage of the Act but did not specifically address the appro-
priate number and scope of bargaining units or the Board's authority to
make such unit determinations on a case-by-case basis. 107
The health care industry, however, in an apparent attempt to influence
subsequent Board decisions, succeeded in persuading the members of both
the House and Senate committees to include in their reports an admonition
100. Taft, supra note 91, at 2.
101. Id. at 3.
102. 120 CONG. REC. 12,944 (1974).
[T]he Board should... consider the issue of the cost of medical care. Undue unit
proliferation must not be permitted to create wage "leapfrogging" and "whipsaw-
ing." The cost of medical care in this country has already skyrocketed, and costs
must be maintained at a reasonable level to permit adequate health care for Ameri-
cans from all economic sectors.
The committee, in recognizing these issues with regard to bargaining unit determi-
nation, took a significant step forward in establishing the factor of public interest to
be considered by the Board in unit cases.
Id. at 12,945.
103. In the period between the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 and the health care
amendments of 1974, there was very little organizational activity among health care workers.
Accordingly, there were very few reported Board decisions regarding appropriate health care
bargaining units. The absence of relevant case law posed a considerable challenge for those
involved in the drafting of the amendments. Taft, supra note 91, at 2.
104. National Labor Relations Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
105. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct.
1539 (1991).
106. "Acute" is defined as: "[h]aving a sudden onset and a short, but rather severe, course
opposed to chronic, which designates a relatively slow onset and a protracted, but mild,
course." SCHMIDT'S ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE A82 (1991). Acute care hospi-
tals are in-patient hospitals with relatively short overnight patient stays.
107. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). In addition, the Act was amended to require
ten-day advance notification of a strike and to increase the notification requirements of a desire
to modify or terminate a collective bargaining unit. Id.
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to the Board against proliferation of bargaining units in the health care in-
dustry."°' The initial impact of the Committee Reports' admonition upon
subsequent Board decisions involving bargaining unit determinations in the
health care industry was considerable.109 In 1989, however, the Board ex-
pressed its view that the admonition itself should not be afforded great
weight in its unit determinations."10 This declaration came shortly after a
concession by the Board that its intention was "at all times to be mindful of
avoiding undue proliferation.. [of bargaining units in the health care indus-
try] not only because this desire was expressed in the legislative history, but
also because it accords with [the Board's] view of what is appropriate in the
health care industry."
'" 2
The Seventh Circuit has characterized the congressional admonition as an
108. Both reports contained the following caveat: "Due consideration should be given by
the Board to preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry." S. REP.
No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
109. Shelton, supra note 58, at 164. For example, in two decisions issued within a year of
the passage of the Amendments, the Board referred to the admonition in support of the avoid-
ance of the proliferations of units in the health care industry. Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento,
Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 766 (1975) (considering the admonition in determining the appropri-
ateness of the units of registered nurses and nurse permittees, professional employees excluding
registered nurses, medical laboratory technologists, service and maintenance employees, cleri-
cal employees and supplemental employees); Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Children, 217
N.L.R.B. 806, 807 (1975) (rejecting the appropriateness of a unit of stationary engineers that
represented five of the employer's eighty-eight employees based on the admonition).
110. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,346
(1989). The Board reasoned that "in the decade between 1974 and 1984[,] ... [d]espite contin-
ual uncertainty as to the proper standard, there was considerable organizational activity, and
... there were virtually none of the disruptive consequences which concerned Congress during
the 1974 debates." Id. at 16,346.
111. Some emphasis has been put on the fact that the Committee Report uses the language
of preventing proliferation rather than preventing undue proliferation. See Legislative History
of the Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the N.L.R.A., H.R. 11,357, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
105 (1974). The word "undue" appears nowhere in the committee reports. Id.
Inexplicably, the Board began using the term ["undue"] in certain health care bar-
gaining unit cases decided in 1975. Unfortunately, this mistake has been com-
pounded through the years. Indeed the phrase undue proliferation [has been used by
the Board] in an apparent attempt to justify greater tolerance than Congress intended
for an increased number of health care bargaining units in health care institutions.
Taft, supra note 91, at 5 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Saint Catherine's Hosp. of Dominican
Sisters, 217 N.L.R.B. 787, 788 (1975).
112. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,905 (1988).
Notwithstanding the above discussion, the Board believes that "Congressional and industry
concern ... [is] directed towards the 15 to 20 plus units that had arisen prior to the amend-
ments and the possibility of scores of units if each hospital classification were permitted to
organize separately." 53 Fed. Reg. 33,933. Current Board Chairman, James Stephens, has
implied that the legislative history of the amendments indicated to him that proliferation
would exist only if the number of bargaining units in an acute care hospital were in the double
digits. 56 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Mar. 24, 1989).
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example of the oxymoron 113 of post-enactment legislative history, calling it a
"sneaky device for trying to influence the interpretation of a statute, in dero-
gation of the deal struck in the statute itself among the various interests
represented in the legislature." '114 Judge Posner warned that "[c]ourts must
be careful not to fall for such tricks and thereby upset a legislative compro-
mise." "5 Consistent with the most recent view of the Board, he rejected the
validity of any influence exerted by the admonition and reiterated a basic
tenet of American government: "Congress legislates by passing bills and
sending them to the president for his signature. It does not legislate by issu-
ing committee reports.' ' 16 The final word came from the Supreme Court,
which ultimately declared without qualification that the admonition does
not have the force of law. 117 It is merely "an expression by the Committees
of their desire that the Board give 'due consideration' to the special problems
that 'proliferation' might create."' "
V. PROMULGATION OF THE RULE
The 1974 health care amendments set in motion the impetus that com-
pelled the Board eventually to break with tradition and to engage in
rulemaking; however, the immediate catalyst was a March 1987 decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
has come to be known as St. Francis 111. 119 The court held that the Board's
reliance on the legislative history of the 1974 amendments and its interpreta-
tion of them as requiring the disparity-of-interests analysis constituted an
abuse of its discretion.' 20 On May 4, 1987, the Board held rare oral argu-
ment regarding St. Francis III to determine which test the Board should
utilize in determining health care bargaining units generally. 2 ' In June of
that same year, the Board held several meetings to consider rulemaking. 22
Berton Subrin, the Director of the Office of Representation Appeals of the
113. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he history of
an event lies in its past, not its future."), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
114. Id. at 657 (citing Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (7th Cir.
1988); In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1984)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1545 (1991).
118. Id. "In any event, we think that the admonition.., is best understood as a form of
notice to the Board that if it did not give appropriate consideration to the problem of prolifera-
tion in this industry, Congress might respond with a legislative remedy." Id.
119. Stickler & Nelson, supra note 63, at 128 (referring to International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Union No. 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
120. 814 F.2d at 714.
121. Stickler and Nelson, supra note 63, at 128.
122. Id.
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National Labor Relations Board, called for broader use by the Board of its
rulemaking authority seven years prior to the Board's decision to do so.,
23
Mr. Subrin woefully admitted that "Board volumes [were] replete with deci-
sions containing lengthy narratives as to whether the plant manager can hire
or fire or schedule or grant overtime, which parking lot or restrooms various
groups use.., or which employees wear common uniforms."' 124 The press-
ing need for a solution to the health care unit issue, the Board's desire to
improve relations with its labor constituency, and outspoken staff initiative
(such as that exemplified by Mr. Subrin's article) all influenced the Board's
consideration of rulemaking on the health care issue.'
25
On July 2, 1987, the Board announced its decision to engage in rulemak-
ing. 126 The Board signalled its apparent agreement with Mr. Subrin that the
two prime considerations of unit determination, at least in the health care
industry, should be predictability and clarity. 127 The Board was optimistic
that rulemaking would be "a valuable long-term investment, paying divi-
dends in the form of predictability, efficiency, and more enlightened determi-
nations as to viable appropriate units, leading ultimately to better judicial
and public acceptance." 121 -
Although the notice and comment procedures of section 553 of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act required only that the Board provide an oppor-
tunity for written comments on the proposed rule,' 29 the Board decided to
hold public hearings, to receive both oral and written comments, and to per-
123. Subrin, supra note 72 at 112-13. Mr..Subrin's article discusses the advantages to the
Board and to the labor relations community of utilizing rulemaking on the subject of appropri-
ate bargaining units generally.
124. Id. at 106.
125. GRUNEWALD, supra note 76, at 35.
126. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987).
The Board explained:
[I]n light of the fact that, after 13 years, we are no further along in achieving consen-
sus.., than we were in 1974, and since ... we are convinced that laborious, costly,
case-by-case recordmaking and adjudication in this remarkably uniform field has
proved to be an unproductive expenditure of the parties' and the taxpayers' funds, we
have decided to engage in rulemaking.
52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,144. The decision to embark on rulemaking was 3-2: Members Bab-
son, Stephens, and Cracraft for rulemaking; Chairman Dotson and Member Johansen against.
Stickler & Nelson, supra note 63, at 128.
127. In Mr. Subrin's opinion, "[I]t matters less what the units deemed appropriate are than
that they be known in advance, with clarity." Subrin, supra note 72, at 107.
128. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,144 (1987).
129. "After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oralpresentation." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) (empha-
sis added).
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mit limited cross-examination. 130 The detailed and exhaustive evidence re-
ceived by the Board at the hearings and during the comment period
substantially exceeded what the Board expected. 131
Industry opponents of the proposed rule put forth many arguments. 132 In
short, the health care industry objected to any rule that required recognition
of more than the statutory minimum of three units, namely, professional
employees, nonprofessional employees, and guards. 3 3 The Board consid-
ered all of the arguments, emphasizing the contentions that the proposed
rule would lead to increased organizing by unions; that multiple units would
result in strikes, repeated strike notices, jurisdictional disputes, and other
130. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,148 (1987). In undertaking this new method of policy formu-
lation, the Board assured the affected parties that there would be full opportunity to participate
since there was concern that without oral testimony and cross-examination the Board would
only receive the kinds of legal arguments that it traditionally heard in adjudications. GRUNE-
WALD, supra note 76, at 18. This form of dialogue was consistent with the model of labor-
management relations that the Board and its constituencies generally accepted. Id. In addi-
tion, this method was intended to minimize the likelihood of legal challenge to the action on
procedural grounds. Id.
131. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988).
The first hearing was held in Washington, D.C. on August 17 and 18, 1987. Id. Twenty
witnesses appeared and 496 pages of testimony were taken. Id. The second hearing was held
in Chicago, IL on August 31 and September 1, 1987. Id. Twenty-seven witnesses appeared
and 521 pages of testimony were taken. Id. The third hearing was held in San Francisco, CA
on September 14, 15, and 16, 1987. Id. Thirty-nine witnesses appeared, and 762 pages of
testimony were taken. Id. The final hearing was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7, 8, 9,
13, 14, 15, and 16, 1987. Id. Fifty-eight witnesses appeared and 1,766 pages of testimony were
taken. Id. At the hearings, any party who wished to testify or ask questions of the various
witness was given an opportunity to do so. Id. The comment period was extended three times
upon the request of various parties. Id. In addition to the 144 witnesses who testified, the
Board received 315 written comments from individuals and organizations representing diverse
points of view totalling approximately 1500 pages. Id. The Board proved serious its conten-
tion that there would be full opportunity for all interested parties to participate.
132. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,336-
37 (1989). The list of arguments that were put forth against rulemaking generally and against
the Final Rule in particular includes: (a) the health care industry is unfairly being singled out
for rulemaking; (b) rulemaking is contrary to the language of § 9(b) of the Act, requiring a
case-by-case approach; (c) the particular units proposed are inappropriate; (d) the implementa-
tion of the proposed rule will lead to increased litigation; (e) the Board should consider an
alternative to a rule, such as a Board panel deciding health care issues; (f) the rule will expedite
the Board's election process and result in insufficient time for an employer to respond to a
union's organizing campaign; (g) hospitals will lose needed flexibility; and (h) if the Board
establishes units, there should be only two units, professionals and nonprofessionals, plus
guards. Id. Some commentators also argued that although the Board was procedurally within
its jurisdiction to adopt appropriate rules as set forth in § 6 of the Act, that this particular rule,
due to its extreme rigidity, did not provide an opportunity for meaningful adjudication "in
each case", and, therefore, fell on its own weight. Stickler & Nelson, supra note 61, at 130.
133. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 561, 654 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, Ill S. Ct.
1539 (1991). In other words, since no rule is necessary to confer rights already granted by the
Act, the industry objected to the promulgation of any rule at all. Id.
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disruptions of health care; and that health care costs would substantially
increase as a result of strikes, work rules, and bargaining and contract
administration. 134
The Board, upon careful consideration of each of the opponents' conten-
tions, either rejected the argument as inconsequential or invalid, or adapted
the rule based on what it accepted as a legitimate concern.13 The Board,
however, emphasized that empirical data in the record revealed that between
1974 and 1984, there were eight distinct units recognized throughout the
industry as appropriate under Board precedent. 36 In addition, the Board
considered that the incidence of strike activity in the health care industry
had been lower than in all other industries.' 37 The Board also rejected out-
right any cost-consideration arguments, noting that the 1974 health care
amendments were passed in response to congressional concerns regarding
low wages and poor working conditions in the health care industry.' 31 The
Board justified its position by concluding that the beneficial objectives of
collective bargaining upon which the Act was based must necessarily be ob-
tained at some financial cost.
139
The Board discussed protracted litigation as another possible motivation
for the health care industry's objection to the rule. Employers initiate pro-
tracted litigation in order to produce "lengthy delays and great difficulties in
organizing."' Under existing Board standards, hospitals could delay
union elections by challenging the composition of the group of employees
134. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,336-37 (1989). The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois later provided a valid opposing argument that case-by-case adjudication may actu-
ally be more appropriate to the Board's function because, in many situations, it is "more ame-
nable to the unique circumstances of employers and employees in diverse settings, and
perhaps, a necessary burden for a labor policy which will extend to employees the fullest free-
dom to exercise their rights." American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 713 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), rev'd, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1991).
135. See generally 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988) and 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989) (both dis-
cussing the Board's consideration of these and other arguments both favoring and opposing
rulemaking generally and specifically in the arena of the determination of health care bargain-
ing units).
136. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,346 (1989).
137. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,908 (1988). Sympathy strikes in hospitals were virtually non-
existent. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,909.
138. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,909 (1988) (citing Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
497 (1978)). "It was anticipated by Congress that the amendments might lead to increased
union organizing and bargaining which in turn might improve employee wages and working
conditions." 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,909 (1988).
139. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,339 (1989). "The statutory amendments enacted by Congress
in 1974 represented an implicit policy decision that collective bargaining in the health care
industry would produce countervailing benefits justifying the costs." Id.
140. 53 Fed Reg. 33,900, 33,902 (1988).
19931
396 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:377
being targeted as a bargaining unit.' 4 ' Subsequent Board hearings on the
legitimacy of the unit, including arguments as to the greater appropriateness
of one group over another, or the inclusion or exclusion of a specific job
classification, or even the status of a specific employee, could be prolonged
for months or years, possibly dooming the union's chances for a successful
election. 142 Management predicted that the proposed rule would replace
this lengthy process with a rubber stamp, thereby destroying the only legal
roadblock to union elections. 143
The Board recounted a reported admission by a management-side consult-
ant that the delays brought about by contesting health care unit determina-
tions were frequently an important part of management's strategy in union
avoidance.'" In contrast, some hospital executives claimed that the pre-
election hearings were encouraged by legitimate concerns that unions were
trying to organize employees into units that were either too small or too
large to be effective for the workers. 14  Unions were skeptical. "'By the
time the NLRB finally settled an issue, all those employees who originally
wanted an election could be fired or retired or dead,' said Gary Robinson,
executive administrator of the Oakland-based American Union of Physicians
and Dentists. 'It was just a cynical attempt by hospitals to manipulate the
rules in their favor.' ,146
Not all members of the health care management community were diamet-
rically opposed to rulemaking. 47 One individual with prior experience as a
department head in several hospitals observed that rulemaking might actu-
ally reduce costs in the industry since both the unions and management
would spend fewer dollars and less time on legal maneuvering and on or-
141. Stein, supra note 39, at 19.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,902 (1988) (citing [Current Developments] Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-2 (BNA) (Aug. 6, 1987), which reported that at a workshop on unions, consultant
Raymond Mickus predicted that the Rule would spark increased union activity). He predicted
faster elections, adding that employers would not have access to the hearings or briefs that
they were accustomed to using to delay the proceedings. Id. Another health care industry
representative agreed, stating," 'The greater the time between the initial union petition and the
election, the less chance there is that the union will win.' " Id. (citing [Current Developments]
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Sept. 29, 1987), which quoted the vice president of labor relations for
Mount Sinai Medical Center addressing management's typical strategy though not necessarily
advocating it himself).
145. Stein, supra note 39, at 19.
146. Id.
147. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,902 (1988). Holy Redeemer Health System predicted that
rulemaking would be a "welcome relief" from the existing situation in which unit determina-
tions were confusing and hard to follow. Id. Kaiser recognized the disadvantages to both
parties of protracted litigation. Id.
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ganizing campaigns.14
Finally on April 29, 1989, after several drafts had been presented for pub-
lic review and commentary, the Board announced its intention to issue the
final rule.149 This notice included the complete version of the final rule (the
Rule).1 50 In short, the Rule provides that the Board will recognize the fol-
148. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,902 (1988).
149. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989). The Board ultimately concluded that, in the health care
industry, "establishing bargaining units by rulemaking [would] better effectuate the purposes
and policies of the National Labor Relations Act than continuing lengthy and costly litigation
over the issue of appropriate bargaining units in each case." Id. One of the five members of
the Board, Wilford W. Johansen, dissented from the Rule, characterizing rulemaking as
"neither desirable nor appropriate" in this situation. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,934-35 (1988).
150. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345. The Rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry.
(a) This portion of the rule shall be applicable to acute care.hospitals, as defined in
paragraph (f) of this section: Except in extraordinary circumstances and in circum-
stances in which there are existing non-conforming units, the following shall be ap-
propriate units, and the only appropriate units . . . except that, if sought by labor
organizations, various combinations of. units may also be appropriate:
(1) All registered nurses.
(2) All physicians.
(3) All professionals except for registered nurses and physicians.
(4) All technical employees.
(5) All skilled maintenance employees.
(6) All business office clerical employees.
(7) All guards.
(8) All nonprofessional employees except for technical employees, skilled mainte-
nance employees, business office clerical employees, and guards.
Provided That a unit of five or fewer employees shall constitute an extraordinary
circumstance.
(b) Where extraordinary circumstances exist, the Board shall determine appropri-
ate units by adjudication.
(c) Where there are existing nonconforming units in acute care hospitals, and peti-
tion for additional units is filed pursuant to sec. 9(c)(l)(A)(i) or 9(c)(l)(B), the Board
shall find appropriate only units which comport, insofar as practicable, with the ap-
propriate unit set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) The Board will approve consent agreements providing for elections in accord-
ance with paragraph (a) of this section, but nothing shall preclude regional directors
from approving stipulations not in accordance with paragraph (a), as long as the
stipulations are otherwise acceptable ....
(f) For purposes of this rule, the term:
(2) Acute care hospital is defined as: either a short term care hospital in which the
average length of patient stay is less than thirty days, or a short term care hospital in
which over 50% of all patients are admitted to units where the average length of
patient stay is less than thirty days .... The term "acute care hospital" shall include
those hospitals operating as acute care facilities even if those hospitals provide such
services as, for example, long term care, outpatient care, psychiatric care, or rehabili-
tative care, but shall exclude facilities that are primarily nursing homes, primarily
psychiatric hospitals, or primarily rehabilitation hospitals.
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lowing, and only the following, eight bargaining units for employers of acute
care hospitals: (1) all registered nurses; (2) all physicians; (3) all profession-
als except for registered nurses and physicians; (4) all technical employees;
(5) all skilled maintenance employees; (6) all business office clerical employ-
ees; (7) all guards; and (8) all nonprofessional employees except for those
specifically listed as appropriate above."'5 The Rule recognizes three excep-
tions: cases that present extraordinary circumstances, 152 cases in which
nonconforming units already exist, 153 and cases in which labor organizations
seek to combine two or more of the eight specified units. 54 The extraordi-
nary circumstances exception applies automatically to hospitals in which the
eight unit rule will produce a unit of five or fewer employees.' 55 The rule is
limited to acute care hospitals but does not differentiate among them by size
or location. 1
56
VI. LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE RULE
In a series of articles published prior to the promulgation of the Rule, the
American Hospital Association (the AHA) expressed a great number of con-
cerns on behalf of the health care industry. The AHA claimed that the im-
mediate effect of the Rule would be an increase in union-organization efforts
and successes "by splintering employee groups within hospitals into unreal-
istically delineated bargaining units."' 57 They worried that as a result,
health care providers would be faced with a multiplicity of organizing cam-
paigns, contract negotiations and arbitration administration as well as in-
creased potential for the disruption of services occasioned by strikes and
(5) A non-conforming unit is defined as a unit other than those described in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (8) of this section or a combination among those eight
units.
(g) Appropriate units in all other health care facilities: The Board will determine
appropriate units in other health care facilities, as defined in section 2(14) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by adjudication.
29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1992).
151. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992). Interestingly, and quite possibly in contradiction, the
Board argued in the course of its rulemaking proceedings that Congress had not intended for
the Board to answer the question of whether any given number of units found appropriate was
proliferative "in the abstract-as if, for example, 'x' number of units are automatically prolifer-
ative, but 'y' are not." 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345 (1989).
152. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(b) (1992).
153. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(c) (1992).
154. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992).
155. Id.
156. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(0 (1992).
157. Rhonda Rhodes, NLRB Issues Second Notice of Bargaining Unit Proposed Rulemak-
ing: Comments Due Oct. 17, HEALTH L. VIGIL, Oct. 7, 1988, at 1, 2.
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work stoppages."'5 They were also concerned that management's ability to
respond to change would be severely restricted.' 59 The AHA asserted that
the Board had ignored the "interdependence, integration, and coordination
of services among health care employees" in arriving at its ultimate unit
determinations."W The AHA predicted that joint ventures, mergers, and af-
filiations would be hampered or impeded by having to face and negotiate
with different labor organizations representing different employee groups
"each with its own political aspirations and economic needs."'' The Rule,
declared the AHA, represented "a threat to the delivery of effective and
cost-efficient health care in this country."'
162
By contrast, unions viewed the Rule as offering hope at a time when de-
spair was the norm. 1 63 According to union representatives, the union move-
ment had fallen on hard times in recent years as a result of the decreasing
employment rates of most U.S. industries.' The health care industry, by
contrast, was vital and expanding, making it an attractive target for union
organization. 165
The AHA ultimately challenged the facial validity of the Rule in the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. ' 66 The district court agreed
with the AHA's position that the Rule violated the congressional admoni-
tion to the Board to avoid the proliferation of bargaining units in the health
care industry and the court accordingly enjoined enforcement of the Rule. 1
67
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no merit in
any of the AHA's arguments, reversed the district court's decision, vacated
158. Stickler & Nelson, supra note 63, at 130.
159. Id.
[T]he carving out of separate units, e.g., for physicians and for registered nurses, will
severely affect the ability of management to change the way in which health care will
be provided patients. Jurisdictional disputes among professional and nonprofessional
employees concerning who has the right to provide what kind of treatment, care, and
services will endanger and restrict management's ability to develop patient care
plans.
Id.
160. Rhodes, supra note 158, at 2.
161. Stickler & Nelson, supra note 63, at 130.
162. Rhodes, supra note 158, at 2.
163. Stein, supra note 39, at 28.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705 (N.D. Il 1989), rev'd, 899
F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct 1539 (1991).
167. American Hosp. Ass'n, 718 F. Supp. at 716. The AHA also argued that the Rule is
arbitrary and capricious as written and that section 9(b) of the Act requires the Board to make
a separate bargaining unit determination "in each case" and, therefore, plainly prohibits the
Board from using general rules to define bargaining units. Id. at 705. These arguments were
later rejected by the Supreme Court. 111 S. Ct. at 1541-47.
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the injunction, and entered judgment for the Board.'68 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari 169 due to the importance of the case and, in a unanimous
decision written by Justice Stevens, affirmed the decision and endorsed the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 17
0
The immediate reaction to the Supreme Court's decision from organized
labor was predictable. "'Many [union] groups with large healthcare mem-
bership are gearing up right now to take advantage of the new rules. There
will be a lot of [collective bargaining unit] petitions filed and a lot of elec-
tions won over the next few years.' ,171 " 'We think there's more of an inter-
est in union representation than ever before.' 'Now its really going to be the
decision of the employees, not the hospital lawyers, which is what the law
intended in the first place.' ,172 Management's dismay was no less surpris-
ing. "'We expect it to have a dramatic impact .... It's going to have a
domino effect on the cost of labor in the industry.' ,173
VII. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE RULE
The Rule affects only those health care facilities that are "acute care hos-
pitals" as defined by the Rule. 174 All health care facilities that are not acute
care hospitals are excluded from the Rule's mandated unit determinations;
appropriate unit determinations in those other facilities will continue to be
made by case-by-case adjudication. 175 The Board's research revealed a tra-
ditionally accepted and commonly understood distinction between acute
168. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 655-60 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'g, 718 F.
Supp. 704 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
169. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990). The AHA's petition for
Supreme Court review was not opposed by the Board, the party intervenors, the American
Nurses Association, or the AFL-CIO.
170. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539, 1541-47 (1991), aff'g, 899 F.2d 651
(7th Cir. 1990).
171. Stein, supra note 39, at 28 (quoting Gary Robinson of the American Union of Physi-
cians and Dentists). Id.
172. Id. (quoting Maureen Anderson, spokeswoman for the California Nurses Associa-
tion). Id.
173. Id. at 19 (quoting Tom Luevano, vice president of human resources and governance
for the California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems).
174. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(g) (1992). The Board used the following statistics in deciding to
apply the Rule only to acute care hospitals:
Of the 4381 registered, private acute care hospitals in the U.S., almost 90% are clas-
sified by AHA as general hospitals; less than 9% are classified as psychiatric. Of the
general hospitals, 98% are medical and surgical hospitals while only 2% are pediat-
ric, obstetric, or rehabilitation hospitals. Inpatient activity accounts for 84% of hos-
pital revenues, and 88% of inpatient beds are allocated to general medical and
surgical care, obstetrics, pediatrics, and intensive care.
53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,902 (1988).
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care and long-term care facilities. 176 It appeared to the Board that there had
been relative uniformity of workforce configurations and job classifications
among acute care hospitals throughout the industry.177 The Board pro-
claimed that rulemaking was a response to a perception that the workforce
of acute care hospitals is particularly susceptible to rules of general applica-
bility regarding the contours of bargaining units.17 Based on the record
presented before it, the Supreme Court agreed.
179
The Rule, however, does not conclusively establish invariable parameters
of bargaining units even when acute care hospitals are involved. 8 ° The Rule
does not affect existing nonconforming units.' The Rule does not preclude
combinations of the eight prescribed units or regional approval of agree-
ments between unions and employers that stipulate the appropriateness of
units that differ from those mandated by the Rule.'8 2 The Board has also
excepted from the coverage of the Rule any employer who can make a show-
ing that extraordinary circumstances exist.' 83 The Board wished to "allow
for the possibility of individual treatment of uniquely situated acute care
hospitals so as to avoid accidental or unjust application of the [R]ule."' 84
The Board has proclaimed its intent, however, to construe this exception
very narrowly, so that it does not provide a loophole for redundant or un-
necessary litigation and the concomitant delay that typically ensues.' 85
In a report prepared for the consideration of and later published by the
Administrative Conference of the United States, Mark H. Grunewald, Pro-
fessor of Law of the Washington and Lee University School of Law, opined
that the prognosis for the Rule was good. 186 Yet he recognized one likely
176. Id. at 33,930.
177. Id.
178. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,904 (1988).
179. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, Ill S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (1991). "The Board's conclu-
sion that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 'acute care hospitals do not differ in substantial,
significant ways relating to the appropriateness of units,' was based on a 'reasoned analysis' of
an extensive record." Id.
180. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932 (1988).
181. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992).
182. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.30(a), (d) (1992).
183. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992).
184. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932 (1988) (footnote omitted). This exception was provided
in order to ensure satisfaction of all parties' due process rights. Id.
185. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932 (1988). "To satisfy the requirement of 'extraordinary
circumstances' a party would have to bear the 'heavy burden' to demonstrate that its argu-
ments are substantially different from those which have been carefully considered at the
rulemaking proceeding." 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,933 (citations omitted).
186. GRUNEWALD, supra note 76, at 36. "The terms of the [R]ule are clear and straight-
forward; the [R]ule establishes appropriate units; it does not merely set standards for units or
presume certain units to be appropriate." Id. In preparation for his report, Grunewald thor-
oughly researched the history of the Rule and interviewed Board officials, members of the
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problem: the potential for a shift in the focus of litigation from the question
of the appropriateness of particular units to the question of the "placement"
of employees in what are concededly appropriate units.'1 7 In his dissent,
Boardmember Johansen also recognized the potential for a shift in litigation,
intimating that it would defeat the Rule's stated purpose of election facilita-
tion.' 8 One of the Board's earliest stated rationales for its decision to ven-
ture into substantive rulemaking was to facilitate the election process." 9
The Board anticipated that rulemaking would ultimately bring about less,
rather than more, litigation over the boundaries of particular units, notwith-
standing its recognition that there still would be litigation on the issue of the
placement of individual job classifications within the eight broadly defined
units."9° Although the Rule is still in its infancy, and its effectiveness may
not accurately be assessed for many years, a review of some of the cases
considered by the Board after the Supreme Court's decision in American
Hospital Association provides insight into the Rule's potential consequences.
A. Saint Margaret Memorial Hospital 91
In Saint Margaret Memorial Hospital, the first published opinion of a deci-
sion arising under the provisions of the Final Rule, the employer averred
that the unit of skilled maintenance employees for which the union peti-
tioned was not an appropriate unit for collective bargaining under section
9(b) of the Act. 92 The Rule specifically includes skilled maintenance em-
ployees as one of the eight prescribed units. 9 3 Although the employer
agreed that the petitioned-for unit conformed to the prescriptions of the
labor-management bar, and representatives of the affected parties, including labor organiza-
tions who had participated in the rulemaking. Id. at 2 n.8.
187. Id. at 36. Although there may be less litigation on the issue of which units are appro-
priate, there may be new litigation on the issue of which employees belong in each of the eight
units.
188. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,935 (1988). Reduced litigation facilitates elections. "Con-
trary to the stated expectations of my colleagues, setting unit configurations by rulemaking will
not in fact substantially reduce the amount of litigation in this area. It may serve to change
part of the focus of that litigation, while at the same time creating more." Id.
189. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987). "In order to facilitate the election process, the ... Board
proposes to amend its rules to include a new provision specifying which bargaining units will
be found appropriate in various types of health care facilities." Id.
190. 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,904 (1988).
191. 303 N.L.R.B. No. 146 (July 29, 1991).
192. Id. at 2-3. The union sought to represent in a single unit of "all skilled maintenance
employees, including stationary engineers, electricians, HVAC mechanics, carpenters, painters,
maintenance mechanics, electronic technicians and HVAC electronic technicians ... ; exclud-
ing all business office clerical employees, all technical employees, and professional employees,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, and all other employees." Id. at 2.
193. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a) (1992).
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Rule, it argued that " 'extraordinary circumstances' exist[ed] within the
meaning of the Rule" that justified a specific determination by the Regional
Director of the appropriateness of the unit for its facility.194 The employer
asserted that, if permitted to do so, it could and would submit evidence to
establish that the skilled maintenance employees share a community of inter-
est with other nonprofessional employees and do not have wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment distinct enough from other non-
professional employees "so as to justify representation in a separate collec-
tive-bargaining unit.'95 The employer therefore suggested that the
appropriateness of the unit must be adjudicated.' 96
In this case, the Board was given its first opportunity to enforce its earlier
declaration that the extraordinary circumstances exception would be nar-
rowly construed. The Board denied the Employer's Request for Review
stating that it "raise[d] no substantial issues warranting review," and, issuing
no opinion of its own, adopted the Regional Director's Decision and Direc-
tion of Election in the case.
The Regional Director pointed out that each of the employer's arguments
had been raised in the course of the rulemaking proceedings and that the
Board had carefully considered each of them in reaching its conclusion that
a separate unit of skilled maintenance employees was appropriate for the
industry. 97 The Regional Director found no support for the contention that
extraordinary circumstances existed that warranted adjudication of the
unit's appropriateness.' 98 The Regional Director ordered an election among
the skilled maintenance employees in the petitioned-for unit, as mandated by
the Rule.' 99
Unit determinations are not a new subject of litigation."°° The determina-
tion of when extraordinary circumstances exist, thereby meriting Board re-
view under the Rule, however, is a novel result of the Rule as written.2°'
The Board has explained that this provision was included and designed in
order to satisfy due process requirements by permitting litigation when the
circumstances of the case are truly extraordinary; the Board has cautioned,
however that the Rule is intended to preclude litigation when the issues
presented are repetitive of considerations entertained by the Board in the
194. Saint Margaret Memorial Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 146 at 4.
195. Id. The employer also pointed to such factors as functions and skill levels; education,
licensing and training; and interaction with other employees. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id. at 6.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 8-9.
200. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
201. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(a), (b) (1992).
1993]
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rulemaking proceedings. 202 It is evident, then, that this type of litigation
was a pre-established element of the Rule.
The employer, arguing the inappropriateness of the unit determination,
presented an issue that was not ultimately decided by the Regional Director
or the Board.2 °3 The employer reminded the Regional Director of the ex-
isting binding precedent of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which holds that a collective bargaining unit that is limited to skilled mainte-
nance employees is not an appropriate unit for bargaining in an acute care
hospital.2" The employer argued that because the Supreme Court, deliber-
ately avoiding any extended comment on the propriety of the specific unit
determinations, did not expressly overrule any existing precedent in its
American Hospital Association decision, the appropriateness of this unit must
be adjudged in light of Third Circuit precedent.2"5 The Regional Director,
in dicta, gave this argument careful consideration, noting Justice Stevens'
explanatory remarks in American Hospital Association that the Court was
silent "solely because these matters primarily concern the Board's exercise of
its authority ... .,,2o' The Regional Director also pointed to the Court's
finding that the Rule was based on a "reasoned analysis" of the Board's
rulemaking record and on the Board's years of experience in the adjudica-
tion of health care issues.207 In denying the Employer's Request for Review
and adopting the Regional Director's Decision and Direction of Election,
the Board tacitly agreed with Justice Stevens.
Although the Board found "nothing in the Supreme Court's decision to
suggest that [the Supreme Court] had any reservations concerning the ap-
propriateness of any of the eight separate bargaining units established by the
Rule,"2 °8 the Board explicitly put on the record that it had reached its ulti-
mate conclusion to deny review in this case "notwithstanding [the fact] that
legal precedent concerning unit determinations which are contrary to the
appropriateness of the eight separate units recognized by the Rule were not
202. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345 (1989).
203. Saint Margaret's Memorial Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 146 at 4-5.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court had stated: "In this opinion, we have deliberately
avoided any extended comment on the wisdom of the rule, the propriety of the specific unit
determinations, or the importance of avoiding work stoppages in acute care hospitals." Amer-
ican Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct 1539, 1547 (1991).
206. Saint Margaret's Memorial Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 146 at 7. Justice Stevens had
explained: "We have pretermitted such discussion not because these matters are unimportant
but because they primarily concern the Board's exercise of its authority rather than the limited
scope of our review of the legal arguments presented by the [AHA]." American Hosp. Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. at 1547.
207. Saint Margaret's Memorial Hosp., 303 N.L.R.B. No. 146 at 7.
208. Id.
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expressly overruled by the Supreme Court's American Hospital Association
decision." 2"
B. Child's Hospital, Inc. 210
In Child's Hospital, Inc., the Board was faced with an employer's Request
for Review of a Regional Director's211 decision that the petitioned-for unit
of registered nurses was appropriate at its facility.2 12 The employer charac-
terized itself as an "amalgam type of institution." '213 The employer argued
that Child's Hospital is not an "acute care hospital" for the purposes of the
Rule. 2 1' In the alternative, the employer argued that there are nevertheless
209. Id. Although the employer's argument merited consideration by the Regional Direc-
tor, no conclusions as to the validity of conflicting precedent were drawn. Id. The issue re-
mains open to litigation.
210. Child's Hosp., Inc., No. 3-RC-9734, NLRB Regional Director's Decision and
Direction of Election (July 22, 1991) [hereinafter Regional Director's Decision in Child's
Hosp., Inc.].
211. In fiscal 1961, the Board delegated its decisional powers with respect to representation
election cases to its twenty-eight regional directors. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
26TH ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1961). This delegation includes decisions as to whether a question
concerning representation exists, determination of appropriate bargaining units, directions of
elections to determine whether employees wish union representation and by whom, and rulings
on other matters such as challenged ballots and objections to elections. Id. Actions taken by
the regional directors are final and binding, subject to discretionary review by the Board in
Washington, D.C. only on very restricted grounds: (1) when a substantial question of law or
policy is raised because of (a) the absence of, or (b) the departure from, officially reported
precedent; (2) when a regional director's finding on a substantial factual issue is clearly errone-
ous, and such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party; (3) when the conduct of the
hearing in an election case or any ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted
in prejudicial error; (4) when there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important
Board rule or policy. Id. at 2.
212. Regional Director's Decision in Child's Hosp., Inc., supra note 213, at 2 n.3. The
petitioned-for unit included all full-time, part-time and per diem employees licensed or other-
wise lawfully authorized to practice as registered professional nurses employed by the em-
ployer to perform registered professional nursing. Id. at 1.
213. Child's Hosp., Inc., No. 3-RC-9734, Employer's Request for Review at 6 (Apr. 15,
1992) [hereinafter Employer's Request for Review in Child's Hosp., Inc.]. The employer is
referring to 54 Fed. Reg. 16,344 (1989), in which the Board recognized a distinction between
an "amalgam type of institution" and a "primarily acute care" hospital. The Board deleted an
initial reference to the primary purpose of a hospital in the Final Rule. Id.
The facility consists of a not-for-profit surgical care center, providing both inpatient and
ambulatory (outpatient) services; a residential nursing home attached to the surgical care
center; and a company that provides shared administrative and security services to both the
hospital and the nursing home. Regional Director's Decision in Child's Hosp., Inc., supra
note 213 at 2 n.2. The nursing home and hospital are not free-standing but are contained in a
single structure. Employer's Brief at 4, Child's Hosp., Inc., (No. 3-RC-9734) (June 27, 1991).
There are, in fact, a substantial number of common areas such as the kitchen, cafeteria, board
room, etc. Id. at 5.
214. Regional Directors Decision in Child's Hosp., Inc., supra note 213, at 2 n.3.
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extraordinary circumstances present that render the unit of registered nurses
inappropriate for its operation.21 5
The employer stressed that, whether viewed from a dollar volume, patient
volume or activity basis, ninety-five percent of Child's Hospital's business
involves outpatient surgery; 216 that the hospital employs forty-two regis-
tered nurses while the nursing home employs twelve registered nurses;
217
and that the average length of stay for hospital patients is 2.3 days. 2 8 The
Regional Director, however, noted that the Board has rejected using the per-
centage of inpatient beds as a basis for excluding an otherwise covered insti-
tution.2 9 He also quoted from an official state document a written
statement by Child's Hospital of its intent to become a "short-term stay care
unit," and he called that characterization "consistent with the definition of
an acute care hospital., 220 Finally, the Regional Director called attention to
the Rule's definition of an "acute care hospital," which has limited exclu-
sions only for those institutions that are primarily either nursing homes, psy-
chiatric hospitals, or rehabilitation hospitals.221
Construing the language of the Rule, the Regional Director concluded
that the Board "deliberately declined to exclude from coverage acute care
hospitals which are primarily devoted to outpatient care, since the Board
specifically referred to outpatient care in the same sentence [in] which it
thereafter enumerated the exclusions., 222 Based on his findings of fact and
interpretation of the Rule, the Regional Director ordered that a representa-
tion election be held in the petitioned-for unit.223
The employer appealed the Regional Director's decision to the Board in
Washington, D.C., and reminded the Board of its previous recognition that
the diverse character of the health care industry precluded industry-wide
generalizations about the appropriateness of any particular bargaining
224unit.  The Board had also asserted that many of today's hospitals have a
number of types of units in addition to overnight, or acute care, units, "such
as outpatient clinics, nursing care units, etc.," and that the Board intended
to exclude such hospitals from coverage of the Rule if any one of the ex-
215. Id.
216. Employer's Brief at 3, Child's Hosp., Inc.





222. Id. The Regional Director was construing 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(0(2) (1992).
223. Regional Director's Decision in Child's Hosp., Inc., supra note 213, at 2 n.3.
224. Employer's Brief at 9, Child's Hosp., Inc. (citing Saint Francis Hosp., 271 N.L.R.B.
948, 953 n.39 (1984)).
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cluded ancillary services predominated. 2 " The employer argued that the
Rule's predetermination of units is based upon fundamental "assumptions
flowing from the role of and services provided by the traditional inpatient
hospital. ' 226 In addition, the employer pointed out that the Board justified
its selection of the eight bargaining units by detailing factors that supported
generalizations as to the appropriateness of the units.227 The employer
viewed itself as a nontraditional inpatient hospital and therefore outside the
coverage of the Rule:22
The definition of "acute care" or "hospital" does not fit the case at
bar, because of the Rules' clear purpose to distinguish "acute"
from "long term" care such as provided at a nursing home. The
administrative history of the Final Rule ... belies any suggestion
that a health care facility is "acute care" unless it is a nursing
home, psychiatric or rehabilitation hospital, since [the Board pro-
vided] for the possibility that additional exclusions would occur
when " .. . ancillary services predominated.
229
On May 9, 1991, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in American
Hospital Association, Jerry M. Hunter, General Counsel for the Board, is-
sued to all Regional Directors a memorandum intended as a shorthand
guide to the processing of hearings on unit determinations under the
Rule. 230 For the determination of a facility's status as an "acute care hospi-
tal", the General Counsel supplied the Regional Directors with a simple
analysis, asking them to determine: (1) whether the facility is a hospital as
defined by the Rule; (2) whether there is a sufficient number of patients re-
ceiving acute care, as calculated by their average length of stay; (3) whether
the facility is primarily a nursing home, primarily a psychiatric hospital, or
primarily a rehabilitation hospital, thereby excluding it from the coverage of
the Rule.2 3 1 In addition, the memorandum explained that the term "acute
care hospital" "shall include those hospitals operating as acute-care facilities
225. Id. (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336. 16.334 (1989)). The Rule, however, does not specifi-
cally exclude facilities that are "primarily outpatient hospitals." See 29 C.F.R. § 103.30
(1992).
226. Employer's Brief at 9-10, Child's Hosp., Inc.
227. Id. at 10.
228. Employer's Request for Review in Child's Hosp., Inc., supra note 216, at 5-6.
"Child's is far closer to an 'outpatient clinic' than a traditional in-patient hospital. Child's
does not perform the full range of services appropriate to a 'hospital' [as defined in the Rule]."
Id. This latter assertion is a reference to 29 C.F.R. § 103.30(f)(1) (1992).
229. Employer's Brief at 11, Child's Hosp., Inc.
230. Memorandum GC 91-3 from Jerry M. Hunter, General Counsel, NLRB, to all Re-
gional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers 1 (May 9, 1991) (on file with The
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
231. Id. at 2.
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even if those hospitals provide such services as, for example, longterm care,
outpatient care, psychiatric care, or rehabilitative care." 23
2
The Regional Director's determination is entirely predictable given the
Rule as written and the direction of the General Counsel's memorandum.
On review, the Board supported the Regional Director's rejection of the em-
ployer's argument that "it is not an acute care hospital [merely] because it
performs a high percentage of ambulatory surgery. '23 3 The Board, how-
ever, also held that the Regional Director had erred in rejecting the em-
ployer's offer of proof because "other issues in the case [raised] substantial
questions warranting a hearing., 234 The case was remanded to the Regional
Director for further hearing with instructions to "permit the parties to intro-
duce such further evidence as is necessary for complete litigation.., in view
of the possibility the Board may ultimately find the employer is (a) taken in
its entirety, not an acute care hospital, or (b) the subject of extraordinary
circumstances.
235
C. Duke University 
2 36
On June 5, 1991, in another memorandum to Regional Directors regard-
ing the Rule, the General Counsel reiterated one of the purposes of the Rule:
"[T]o establish stable and consistent law with respect to appropriate health
care units covered by the rule, so as to reduce the frequency and length of
hearings. '2 37 He conceded, however, that there would "continue to be dis-
agreements as to unit placement issues in some health care cases."' 238 To
assist the Board agents in handling union-management disagreements, the
General Counsel attached research materials on over seventy-five frequently
litigated health care unit classifications and set forth the Board's views as to
which of the eight units established by the Rule encompassed each employ-
ment position, based on generally consistent, pre-existing Board
precedent.239
232. Id.
233. National Labor Relations Board Order at 1, Child's Hosp., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. No. 14
(No. 3-RC-9734) (Sept. 20, 1991).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2. Here, the Board must interpret the definition of "acute care hospital" as it
applies to an "amalgam facility" and, again, must litigate the existence of extraordinary cir-
cumstances. Id.
236. Duke Univ., No. 1 -RC-5779, NLRB Regional Director's Decision and Direction of
Election (July 30, 1991) [hereinafter Regional Director's Decision in Duke Univ.].
237. Memorandum GC 91-4 from Jerry M. Hunter, General Counsel, NLRB, to All Re-
gional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (June 5, 1991) (on file with The
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1-2. The General Counsel explained that the materials were offered for assist-
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In Duke University, the petitioning union and the employer agreed that
the University's Medical Center is an acute care hospital facility.2" The
parties, however, disagreed on both the scope and the composition of the
petitioned-for unit.24 ' The union petitioned for an election among full-time
bus drivers.2 42 The employer argued that the unit of its full-time bus drivers
was comprised of "[']health care employees['] who should be included in an
all-encompassing non-professional unit within the health care facility" as
mandated by the Rule.24 3 In the alternative, the employer contended that
the only appropriate unit would be a unit composed of all of the employer's
service employees. 2 "
Duke University is an educational institution that includes in its opera-
tions an undergraduate university with a school of nursing, a hospital (the
"Medical Center"), and a school of medicine.2 4 Duke University Transit
provides transportation to all of the university's students and employees, as
well as to visitors to the campus and to the Medical Center.24 6 The Medical
Center directly employs approximately 12,500 of the 19,000 Duke Univer-
sity employees. 24 7 The full-time bus drivers are headquartered in a separate
and distinct transportation building of the University along with the em-
24ployer's operating engineers. " In addition, "[a]ll hiring decisions relative
to bus drivers are made within the [e]mployer's campus transportation de-
partment. 24 9 The bus drivers are supervised, scheduled and disciplined by
the transportation department. 2 ' ° Full-time bus drivers wear distinctive
uniforms.25 ' They routinely lunch together in the transportation building
and have only limited interaction with other nonprofessional employees of
the University.25 2
ance only and that they had not been approved by the Board as representing "the current
thinking of any particular Board Member or, in fact, even of a majority of the current Board."
Id. at 2.
240. Regional Director's Decision in Duke Univ., supra note 239, at 3 n. .
241. Id.
242. Id. There are approximately fourteen employees in this unit. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The Medical Center consists of two full-service hospitals. Duke Univ., No. 11-
RC-5779, Employer's Request for Review at 15-16 (Aug. 13, 1991) [hereinafter Employer's
Request for Review in Duke Univ.]. The hospitals have more than 36,000 admissions per year
with over 850 acutely ill patients receiving care on a daily basis. Id.
246. Regional Director's Decision in Duke Univ., supra note 239, at 3 n.1.
247. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 6.




252. Id. at 3-4 n.l.
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Noting that the full-time bus drivers are directly employed by the campus
transportation department and are only involved with Medical Center em-
ployees to the extent that those employees ride on buses, the Regional Direc-
tor found that the full-time bus drivers are not health care employees. 253 He
applied pre-Rule precedent and found a distinct community of interest
among the full-time bus drivers.254 He held that the full-time bus drivers
comprise a separate collective bargaining unit appropriate for representation
by the union of their choice, should they so decide. 2"
The employer objected to what it characterized as the Regional Director's
departure from Board precedent in his refusal to apply the Board's "fifty
percent rule.",2 6  "This approach directly contravenes well-established
Board precedent which has historically required that an employee's health
care status be determined by looking not at the employee's job duties or
integration with other hospital personnel, but rather at the amount of time
employees spend on health care related activities.
'257
The employer's argument was presented quite succinctly. "The Medical
Center is a unique acute care hospital ... in that it is fully integrated with
Duke University.",258 The uncontroverted evidence indicated that the full-
time bus drivers spend a majority of their time servicing the Medical
Center.259 The fifty percent rule holds that the full-time bus drivers are,
therefore, health care workers. 260 As a result, the full-time bus drivers are
subject to the provisions of the Rule that require special bargaining units for
253. Id. at 4 n.l.
254. Id. He also pointed to their distinct occupational skills, as evidenced by a licensing
requirement, and to their headquarters in a distinct facility. Id.
255. Id.
256. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 8; see, e.g., Duke
Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799, 800 (1975).
As far back as 1971, when non-profit hospitals were exempt from the Act, the Board
determined that employees who, on an individual basis, "spend a majority of their
time performing duties related to the patient care functions of the Hospital" were
"health care" employees excluded from the Act. The Board later refined this rule to
exclude those employees who, taken as a group, spent 50 percent or more of their
time performing "hospital related work."
Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248 at 8-9 (citations omitted). Sub-
sequent to the 1974 health care amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974), in an
earlier Duke University case, the Board retained the fifty percent rule to conclude that Duke
University's twenty-two switchboard operators were health care workers. Duke University,
217 N.L.R.B. at 800.
257. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 8 (citing Duke
University, 217 N.L.R.B. 799 (1975)).
258. Id. at 4.
259. Id. at 11-12.
260. Id. at 10-12.
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acute care hospitals.2 6 ' Relying upon Board precedent, the employer dis-
missed any suggestion that the fifty percent rule does not apply to employees
whose duties seem to be far-removed from the health care facility.
262
The employer also pointed to the Board's decision in Kirksville College of
Osteopathic Medicine, Inc., a pre-Rule decision in which the Board held that
when a college and its hospitals are so highly integrated that their functions,
administration, and workforce straddle both entities, the entire facility
should be regarded as a health care institution within the meaning of the
Act.26 3 In finding Kirksville College to be an integrated health care institu-
tion, the Board was concerned with the potential disruption of health care
services .26  Duke University submitted uncontested evidence that the Medi-
cal Center is highly integrated with the whole of the University in terms of
its administration, core functions, and workforce. 265 Like the Kirksville
College employees, many of Duke's employees, including the full-time bus
drivers, service both the traditional university campus and the Medical
Center.266 The employer contended that "the Medical Center completely
depends on these employees and could not provide patient care without
them.
, 267
Finally, the employer insisted that because this was a case of first impres-
sion under the Rule, the Regional Director's decision presented a substantial
question of policy and, therefore, the Board should grant its request for re-
view. 26' The employer reminded the Board that during the promulgation of
the Rule, the Board had stated an intention "at all times to be mindful of
avoiding undue proliferation ... because it accords with [the Board's] view
of what is appropriate in the health care industry. '2 69 The employer dis-
dainfully predicted that the Regional Director's decision to exclude the full-
time bus drivers from the Rule would result in the first of many small bar-
261. Id. at 4.
262. Id. at 11. The employer is referring to the Board's application of the fifty percent rule
to animal caretakers and housekeepers, parking lot attendants, and switch board operators.
Id. (citing Georgetown University, 200 N.L.R.B. 215, 217 (1972); Duke University, 194
N.L.R.B. 236, 236 (1971); Duke University 217 N.L.R.B. 799, 800 (1975)).
263. Id. at 12 (citing Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 794, 795
(1985)).
264. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 794, 795 (1985).
265. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 13.
266. Id. at 13. In Kirksville College, the Board found that "the employees in several de-
partments serve both the college and the hospitals in such an integrated fashion that their
functions cannot be assigned to one or the other, and it is impossible to draw a line between
them." Kirksville College, 274 N.L.R.B. at 795.
267. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 13 (emphasis
omitted).
268. Id. at 15.
269. Id. at 15. See 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,905 (1988).
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gaining units that would create a distinct threat to the hospital's vital opera-
tions.270  "Thus, the acute care hospital is left vulnerable to the very
disruptions the Board sought to avoid, only because the drivers do not exclu-
sively service its facilities."
271
VIII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RULE
In the following situations, the Rule requires that the Board engage in
adjudication in order to determine the appropriateness of bargaining units in
acute care hospitals: when extraordinary circumstances exist, when applica-
tion of the Rule results in a unit of five or fewer employees, when there are
existing nonconforming units and a petition for additional units is filed, and
when various combinations of units are sought by a labor organization.2 72
The General Counsel also points out that the Board left for adjudication the
issue of the continuing validity of Board precedent regarding the treatment
of residual units and that the Rule does not determine the placement of indi-
vidual employees in specific units.27 3 A cursory examination of these situa-
tions reveals that they required adjudication prior to the promulgation of the
Rule. 274 Their determination was, therefore, left untouched by the Rule. In
addition to those uncodified, pre-existing requirements of adjudication, it has
27 -been shown that the Rule also created new arenas for litigation. 7 Anumber of other situations that have not yet come before the Board are
270. Employer's Request for Review in Duke Univ., supra note 248, at 16. "In order to
provide such large scale patient care, [the Medical Center's] employees simply must get in to
work.... The Medical Center completely depends on the bus drivers to bring its employees to
work." Id.
271. Id. The Board has yet to rule on the issues presented by this most recent Duke Uni-
versity case. The employer's arguments are, however, formidable and arguably worthy of
Board review and adjudication. Again, the Board is faced with the issue of the Rule's effect on
Board precedent pre-dating the Rule and the issue of potential case-by-case adjudication of
"acute care hospital."
272. 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.30(a)-(c) (1992).
273. Memorandum GC 91-3, supra note 233, at 4-5. See Levine Hosp. of Hayward, Inc.,
219 N.L.R.B. 327 (1975) (explaining residual units and the Board's treatment thereof).
274. This is most evident when it is considered that the Board's previous policy required
adjudication of each and every unit determination on a case-by-case basis. See supra notes 53-
67 and accompanying text.
275. See discussion supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
litigation to determine, e.g., where a particular employee classification falls into the eight
broadly defined categories of the Rule, the validity of contradictory circuit court precedent, the
status of health care facilities that operate as a part of a larger institution or that offer a unique
mix of services, the meaning of "acute care hospital" in certain circumstances, the existence of
extraordinary circumstances that might exempt a hospital from the coverage of the Rule, and,
should extraordinary circumstances be found to exist, the appropriateness of petitioned-for
bargaining units for a given employer).
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likely also to require litigation.2 7 6 Interestingly, the industry, once vehe-
mently opposed to the Rule, is already using it as a part of its strategy to
prevent, postpone, or minimize the effects of unionization.27 7
There is no doubt that with regard to the determination of the appropri-
ateness of bargaining units in the health care industry the need for case-by-
case adjudication will continue. The Board, it seems, purposefully con-
structed a rule that leaves room for the exercise of discretion when appropri-
ate. The Seventh Circuit has supported the Board's position, stating that
"[t]he decision how much discretion to eliminate from the decisional process
is itself a discretionary judgment. 2 7' Arguably, the Board's careful consid-
eration of the conflicting arguments and the Rule's resulting flexibility as-
sisted the Board in defending against the American Hospital Association's
attacks in the circuit court as well as in the Supreme Court. In any event,
the AHA's prediction that the Rule would "foreclose virtually any type of
case-by-case adjudication or consideration of the unique circumstances char-
acterizing a hospital that is party to representation proceedings thereby fore-
closing .. .any possibility of meaningful appellate review of the Board's
health care unit determinations 2 79 appears to have failed to materialize.
When the dust settles, will there be less litigation than there was prior to
the promulgation of the Rule? That was neither the sole nor the primary
goal of the Board in its decision to embark on rulemaking in this arena; nor
is such the Rule's sole or primary purpose at the present. More appropriate
questions are: Does the Rule "facilitate the election process?"28 ' Does the
Rule "reduce the.., length of hearings?' 21  Does the Rule "avoid unneces-
sary litigation?" 282 Given that the Rule has conclusively established eight
mandatory and exclusive bargaining units for acute care hospitals in most
276. Some possibilities include: (1) How should multi-skilled employees be handled? (2)
Given that section 9(b) of the Act entitles guards to form their own separate unit, how should
the Board handle a guard unit in an acute care hospital that has five or fewer members? (3)
How has the promulgation of the Rule affected the standards that the Board applies in cases in
which a health care provider is not an acute care hospital? (4) How does the Rule affect decer-
tification petitions in which the employees vote to discontinue union representation?
277. Regional Director's Decision in Duke Univ., supra note 239, at 3-4 n.l.
278. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Heckler v.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1983); Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S., 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir.
1970); Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In addi-
tion, the Seventh Circuit found that, although the Rule was not without room for improve-
ment, "[t]he Board did [do] a reasonable job of weighing the conflicting arguments."
American Hosp. Ass'n, 899 F.2d at 660.
279. Taft, supra note 91, at 1.
280. 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,142 (1987).
281. Memorandum GC 91-4, supra note 240, at 1.
282. 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,345 (1989).
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situations, 283 it is safe to say that the Rule will in fact significantly reduce the
litigation and subsequent delay that was inherent in the previously
mandatory case-by-case adjudication of the appropriateness of petitioned-for
health care bargaining units in most situations. This result will no doubt be
lauded by Mr. Subrin who lamented that "[l]awyers, administrators, and
judges have matters of higher significance to attend to than hearing each and
every detail of the supervision or integration at Joe's grocery store before
announcing ... whether a meat department unit will or will not be deemed
appropriate at Joe's." '284 Mr. Subrin was not blind to the practical reality
that rulemaking would not put an end to litigation of the issue.2" 5 He pre-
dicted that, in any rulemaking endeavor, "[h]owever bright the lines that are
drawn, there will inevitably remain some dimly lit penumbras requiring fur-
ther illumination by adjudication."2" 6 Yet he came to the conclusion that
rulemaking was an appropriate direction for the Board to take.287 Conse-
quently, the Board, a collection of five presidential appointees, is left with
"more time for statesmanlike thinking about larger issues, ' 288 and the par-
ties to representation proceedings are "free to pursue their respective con-
cerns, including, should the employees choose, a collective bargaining
relationship.,
289
The AHA's fear that the Rule would lead to increased, aggressive organiz-
ing efforts by unions seeking to represent the employees of acute care hospi-
tals was not unfounded or zealously prejudicial. Indeed, the same result was
anticipated by all of the parties to rulemaking, including the Board.290 To
date, however, no dramatic change in the level of organizational activity has
been observed by the Board.291' Although there is no conspicuous explana-
tion for this improbable denouement, it is unlikely that an assessment of the
Rule this early in the course of its application can be presumed to be a com-
prehensive review. The recovery period may be longer than anticipated.
However, despite the legitimate concerns of the AHA, the promulgation of
the Rule and its subsequent survival in the Supreme Court have not signifi-
cantly affected the cost or availability of health care services in this country.
Notwithstanding the outcome of a future balancing of the Rule's ultimate
283. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1992).
284. Subrin, supra note 72, at 108.




289. Subrin, supra note 72, at 108.
290. Interview with John E. Higgins, Jr., Solicitor General of the National Labor Relations
Board, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 17, 1992).
291. Id.
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benefits and burdens, it may presently be declared that in the course of the
rulemaking endeavor, the Board's efforts accomplished some of the major
putative purposes of rulemaking as a means of creating and implementing
policy. 292 First, the Board accumulated an incredible volume of data that
would not have been available through the adjudication process.293 Second,
the process provided a degree of openness and broad scale participation by
all affected parties unmatched by the traditional Board proceedings.294 Fi-
nally, the Rule produces a degree of clarity and stability, however controver-
sial, for an area of policy that had been overwhelmed by subtlety,
complexity, and change.295
Future changes to the Rule, if necessary, can be accomplished on an out-
patient basis, now that the major surgery has been declared a success.296
The Board has finally admitted itself in to the realm of major substantive
rulemaking. Having survived this bout, the Board should feel more at ease
to augment further the Act with predictability and clarity, operating with
the precise instruments of rulemaking that were prescribed for that very
purpose.
IX. POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the initial drafts of this comment, the Board issued opinions
in Child's Hospital, Inc. 297 and Duke University.29 A brief description of
the Board's holding in each case follows.
292. GRUNEWALD, supra note 76, at 37.
293. Id. "[Wlere we to continue to decide the appropriateness of units .. . solely by adjudi-
cation, we would not have the advantage of the great mass of evidence presented to us in this
rulemaking proceeding. Indeed the production of relevant information is one of the chief ad-
vantages of rulemaking over adjudication." 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,904 (1988). "The docket
is an organized and complete file of all the information submitted to or otherwise considered
by the NLRB in the development of [the] proposed rulemaking . . . including a verbatim
transcript of the hearings, the exhibits, the written statements, and all comments submitted to
the Board, is available for public inspection during normal working hours at the Office of the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C." 53 Fed. Reg. at
33,934.
294. GRUNEWALD, supra note 76, at 38.
295. Id.
296. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,339 (1989).
[W]e are under no illusions that the answers we now provide will necessarily solve all
health care unit problems, for all time.... At some future date, after the rule has had
a fair trial, it may be appropriate to reexamine the rule to determine how well it has
worked, whether new developments have changed our underlying assumptions and
require different conclusions, and whether some other provisions might improve
those now promulgated.
Id.
297. 307 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (Apr. 15, 1992).
298. 306 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Feb. 28, 1992).
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In Child's Hospital, Inc., the Board recognized the dilemma that the cir-
cumstances of Child's Hospital presented under the Rule:
The Board here is asked to determine the scope of a unit at a single
facility composed of both an acute care hospital and a nursing
home, both of which are substantial components of the overall fa-
cility. Acute care hospitals are expressly covered under the Rule;
however, facilities that are primarily nursing homes are expressly
excluded, both from the definition of acute care hospital and from
the Rule itself.299
Careful to explain that this facility was of an "unusual nature," and avoid-
ing the issue of whether the hospital and nursing home together met the
definition of" 'acute care hospital' as set forth in the Rule (patient stay re-
quirement of less than 30 days)," the Board held that "it would not be feasi-
ble or sensible to automatically apply the Rule." 3" The Board reasoned
that "[t]o attempt to fit this hybrid facility within a rule that is designed to
cover the more typical free-standing acute care hospital may, possibly, lead
to an anomalous or impractical result ....
The Board remanded the case to the Regional Director with "directions to
reopen the hearing to permit the parties.., to adduce additional evidence on
the unit issue should they desire to do so," and with instructions to issue a
supplemental decision, consistent with the Board's decision in Park Manor
Care Center,a°2 as to the appropriateness of the unit sought.3 °3
In Duke University, the Board, rejecting the employer's assertion that
"employees who spend 50 percent of their time in support of the Medical
Center... should be deemed health care workers,"9304 the Board affirmed
the Regional Director's finding that the bus drivers were not health care
workers.3 5 The Board distinguished Kirksville College:306 "At Kirksville
College patient care was interwoven throughout the institution; most physi-
299. Id. at 7-8. The Board found that the evidence established that all three facilities were
"sufficiently integrated, both physically and operationally, as to require that they be treated as
a single facility." Id. at 7.
300. Id. at 8 & n.14.
301. Id. at 8.
302. 305 N.L.R.B. No. 135 (Dec. 18, 1991) (setting forth general principles applicable to
unit determinations for health care facilities not covered by the Rule and discussing the rea-
sons for excluding nursing homes from the definition of acute care hospital).
303. Child's Hosp., Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. No. 14, at 9-10. Because the Regional Director's
decision in Child's Hosp., Inc. was decided prior to the issuance of the Board's Park Manor
decision, the parties had not "had an opportunity to address the appropriateness of the unit in
light of the considerations set forth in Park Manor." Id. at 9.
304. Duke Univ., 306 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 5 (Feb. 28, 1992).
305. Id. at 2.
306. 275 N.L.R.B. 794 (1985).
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cians on the facility treated patients at the health care center, and the medi-
cal teaching process took place throughout the entire complex. That has not
been demonstrated to be the case at Duke.,
307
In addition, the Board supported the Regional Director's decision not to
apply the fifty percent rule as enunciated in the Board's earlier Duke Univer-
sity 308 case." There, according to the Board, the fact that the switchboard
operators spend a majority of their time handling calls for the Medical
Center was "but one of a number of factors cited by the Board in finding that
a unit limited to switchboard operators was not appropriate. "310 In fact, the
Board stated emphatically that "[s]ince the passage of the 1974 health care
amendments, there is no continuing need for a breakdown of work duties by
percentage in order to determine the Board's jurisdiction. 3 '1 The Board
found that "the [Kirksville] operators' intimate involvement in the provision
of medical care" was a more important consideration, and that, in that re-
spect, they "were much more directly involved in medical care" than were
the Duke bus drivers.312
The Board dismissed "policy considerations such as a concern for the po-
tential disruption of health care services in the event of a work stoppage" as
"weigh[ing] in favor of treating the drivers as health care employees." 313
The Board distinguished " 'patient care situations' "from " 'purely adminis-
trative health care connected facilities,'" holding that the bus drivers per-
formed the latter function, a function that "could easily be replaced in the
event of a work stoppage.
' 314
The Board concluded that "[i]nasmuch as the Board's Rule on collective
bargaining units in the health care industry applies by its terms to acute care
307. Duke Univ., 306 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 6 (Feb. 28, 1992) (footnote omitted).
308. Duke Univ., 217 N.L.R.B. 799 (1975).
309. Duke Univ., 306 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 7-10 (Feb. 28, 1992).
310. Id. at 9.
311. Id. at 9 n. 10. The Board thus overruled the "inflexible, mathematical approach" of
the fifty percent rule enunciated in the earlier Duke University, 217 N.L.R.B. 799 (1975), and
its progeny, to the extent that those cases suggested that other circumstances may be disre-
garded. Duke Univ., 306 N.L.R.B. No. 101, at 10 n.12.
312. Id. at 9, 10. According to the Board, the bus drivers' "only connection to the Medical
Center is that the Medical Center employees and patients ride on buses." Id. at 1b n. 13. The
Board did agree with the employer, however, that the Regional Director "improperly relied on
the operators' physical location in the Medical Center as a basis for distinguishing" the earlier
Duke University case. Id. at 10 n.ll.
313. Id. at 7.
314. Id. at 7 & n.8 (citing Damon Medical Lab., 234 N.L.R.B. 333, 334 n.1 (1978) (which
cited the legislative history of the 1974 health care amendments)).
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hospitals, and the drivers are not employees of an acute care hospital, their
representational interests are not affected by the Rule. 3 15
John P. Simmons
315. Id. at 11.
